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Abstract 
The demographic transition in industrialized countries poses challenges to the pension 
system which is essentially organized according to the pay-as-you-go principle in most 
countries. This paper aims at analyzing two proposals for pension reform in a theoretical 
model that endogenously explains the retirement and training decision of workers who are 
heterogeneous in ability. Because the economic benefits of motivating late retirement 
strongly depend on the employment prospects of workers near retirement age, the model 
includes the firms' employment decision at the extensive margin. 
The first reform proposal, the implementation of individual retirement accounts, increases 
the workers' incentives to acquire skills and to postpone retirement. However, if the capital 
funded pillar of the pension system becomes strong, low-ability workers may not attain their 
optimal retirement age because firms refuse to employ them any longer. In a similar manner, 
the second reform proposal to increase the minimum retirement age may not work for low-
ability workers if their separation date is determined by the firms before the minimum 
retirement age is achieved. 
Keywords 
Pension Reform, Endogenous Retirement, Human Capital Formation, Tax-Benefit Link, 
Individual Retirement Accounts, Minimum Retirement Age 
JEL Classification 
D91, H55, J24, J26, J31 1 Introduction
Starting from the "golden age of retirement" (Cremer and Pestieau (2000)), the demographic transition
in industrialized countries poses challenges to the pension system and the economy as a whole (Bovenberg
and Knaap (2005)). Declining fertility and increasing life expectancy give rise to prolonged demographic
change that continuously changes the size and the composition of the labor force.1 This topic has received
much attention in recent years, mainly due to the expected sharp increase in the ratio of retirees per active
worker. For example, in Switzerland, the ratio of people above 65 relative to the active population of
age 20-64 is expected to increase from 30.1% in 2000 to 50.5% in 2060 (KommissionfürKonjunkturfragen
(2005)).
The economic impact of this demographic change mainly derives from the reduction in aggregate labor
supply and the impact on ﬁscal and social security budgets, necessitating either a signiﬁcant reduction in
old-age beneﬁts, an increase in social security contribution rates, an increase in the minimum retirement
age or other measures to improve labor market participation (Disney (2000)).2 Börsch-Supan (2003)
and Martín (2003) argue that in order to ﬁnance the current pension system, contributions and tax
rates would have to rise substantially which reduces labor force participation of younger cohorts and
destabilizes the pension system even more. For example, while the average contribution rate in the
European Union was 16% in 2000, it will increase to 27% in 2050 if the present beneﬁt rules are kept
unchanged (EuropeanCommission (2001)).
The trend of declining labor force participation is aggravated by the fact that an increasing fraction
of older workers decides to retire early (Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2004)). The reason is that existing
pension systems impose considerable negative accrual rates of pension wealth and thus provide economic
incentives to leave the active population at younger and younger ages (Samwick (1998)). Gruber and
Wise (2005) provide an extensive source on retirement behavior in industrialized countries. However,
there is a second argument why labor force participation is low among older workers. In most industrial
countries, the number of older workers in unemployment is disproportionately high which implies that
the employment prospects of workers near retirement age are signiﬁcantly reduced (Bingley and Lanot
(2004)).
Besides its adverse eﬀects on the pension system, population aging may induce individuals to invest
more in their human capital if aging is accompanied with postponed retirement and longer working periods
(Echevarría (2003)). According to consistent ﬁndings in the literature, human capital accumulation and
economic growth are increased via these channels, possibly even without changes in the system of old-age
provision.3 However, most of the existing analysis of demographic change and pension reforms has been
1In the European Union, life expectancy at age 65 has increased by more than one year per decade since 1950 (Cremer,
Lozachmeur, and Pestieau (2004)).
2Acording to Hines and Taylor (2005), the US Social Security trust fund will be empty in 2044. Martín (2003) uses
a CGE model to analyze how pension reforms may alleviate the expected ﬁnancial diﬃculties of current PAYG systems.
In the long-run, the ﬁnancial sustainability of pension systems may also be improved by immigration or family policy
(Kirchgässner (2005)). However, Börsch-Supan (2003) argues that the decrease in the relative size of the economically
active population cannot be balanced by higher capital intensity.
3Cf. de la Croix and Licandro (1999a), Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), Boucekkine,
de la Croix, and Licandro (2002), Soares (2005) and Echevarría (2004)
3cast in a framework of ﬂexible labor markets with endogenous labor supply.4 Pension reform in the
presence of labor market frictions (for example Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2004)) or with endogenous
human capital formation (for example Jensen, Lau, and Poutvaara (2004)) is considered quite rarely.
This paper aims at closing this gap by developing a two-period partial-equilibrium model that analyzes
the implications of two proposals for pension reform with a particular focus on retirement age and human
capital formation. It is important to incorporate human capital formation into the analysis of pension
reforms because extending the working life increases the return to education and thus fosters the workers’
incentives to acquire skills (Trostel (1993)).
The contribution of this paper is twofold because the formal analysis of pension systems is extended
in two important ways. First, we derive endogenously the worker’s training intensity and the date of
retirement which both depend on the individual ability of the worker. In line with Cremer, Lozachmeur,
and Pestieau (2004) and Martín (2003), the retirement age increases with the worker’s productivity which
depends on initial ability and the level of training. Second, our model includes the employment decision of
the ﬁrms that decide how long to continue production with the workers. The ﬁrms’ employment decision
can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the implications of pension reforms because workers and ﬁrms separate as soon
as one party decides to leave the market. Hence, the eﬀects of pension reforms strongly depend on the
workers’ employment prospects near retirement age. In a nutshell, there are two key questions considered
in this paper: Starting from the current pension system of traditional pay-as-you-go, what is the impact
of diﬀerent pension reforms on the worker’s incentives with respect to retirement age and human capital
formation? And second, what are the actual eﬀects of these pension reforms subject to the employment
decision of the ﬁrms?
In a ﬁrst step, we analyze the introduction of individual retirement accounts which imply to (partly)
move the pension system from a pay-as-you-go towards a capital funded system. In aggregate, there
is a double beneﬁt from such a reform: reductions in labor market distortions at the extensive margin
(retirement age) as well as increased human capital formation at the intensive margin (training intensity).
Hence, the implementation of individual retirement accounts increases the workers’ incentives to acquire
skills and to postpone retirement. However, if the capital funded pillar of the pension system becomes
strong and workers strive to signiﬁcantly postpone retirement, low-ability workers may not attain their
optimal retirement age because ﬁrms refuse to employ them any longer. In this case, the beneﬁts of
pension reform mainly accrue for high-ability workers while the beneﬁts for low-ability workers are reduced
once their employment prospects near retirement age are controlled for.
In a second step, we analyze an increase in the minimum retirement age without changing the fun-
damental nature of the pay-as-you-go system. Again, only high-ability workers may be aﬀected because
they are forced to stay inside the labor market until they have reached the minimum retirement age. In
contrast, there may be no impact on low-ability workers if their separation date is determined by the
ﬁrms before the minimum retirement age is achieved.
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section discusses the theory of old-age provision, labor
4Cf. Lindbeck and Persson (2003), Feldstein and Liebman (2002), Cutler, Poterba, Sheiner, and Summers (1990),
Feldstein and Samwick (1999), Fehr (2000), Kotlikoﬀ (2002) and Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoﬀ (2004).
4supply and human capital formation. In Section 3, our partial-equilibrium model is developed and the
decision problems of workers and ﬁrms are discussed. In Section 4 of this paper, we describe the current
pension system with traditional pay-as-you-go and its implications for the workers’ behavior with respect
to retirement and training. In Sections 5 and 6, the two proposals for pension reforms are analyzed
depending on the individual ability of the workers. Section 7 concludes.
2 Old-Age Provision, Labor Supply and Human Capital
2.1 Diﬀerent Pension Systems
Two important arguments for the existence of social security systems are the myopia of those individuals
who do not save adequately for their old-age provision and the asymmetric information between gov-
ernment and workers with respect to voluntarily chosen poverty (Feldstein (1985) and Kotlikoﬀ, Spivak,
and Summers (1982)).5 According to Feldstein (1974), social security wealth is equal to "the present
actuarial value of the social security beneﬁts to which the current adult population will be entitled at
age 65 minus the present actuarial value of the social security taxes that they will pay before reaching
that age". Obviously, this term means not real wealth but corresponds to a claim on current and future
taxpayers (Feldstein (1996)).
In general, there are two diﬀerent concepts of old-age provision, namely the pay-as-you-go system and
the capital funded system. Feldstein (2005a) and Keuschnigg (2005) provide an overview.
2.1.1 Capital Funding
With a capital funded pension system, the worker’s contributions are paid into an individual account
where they accumulate with interest until they are paid out during retirement in the form of actuarially
fair pensions. The individual rate of return on one’s own contributions corresponds to the market rate of
interest, reduced by an administrative fee. Hence, every generation ﬁnances its old-age provision from its
own savings accumulated during the previous working life (Feldstein (1974)). Because the pension system
generates the same rate of return that workers could earn via private investments on the capital markets,
there is no distortive tax involved. The contributions to the funded system simply replace private savings
that would otherwise have been necessary to provide for old-age income.
In theory, old-age provision according to the capital funding principle constitutes a perfect substitute
for private saving. Hence, a forced increase in social security will reduce private savings by an equal
amount so that consumption, bequests, and aggregate savings will be unaﬀected (Barro (1974)). However,
this oﬀset between private and pension wealth may be less than one-for-one due to potential counter-
eﬀects such as bequest motives, myopia, liquidity constraints and political risks (Bottazzi, Jappelli, and
5According to the empirical analysis by Reimers and Honig (1996), at least men behave myopically because they respond
to current retirement beneﬁts rather than to their social security wealth.
5Padula (forthcoming)).6 In a nutshell, the accumulated assets of pension funds are a major source of
aggregate savings and can easily run up to 100 percent of GDP and more, depending on the size of
contributions allocated to the system (Feldstein (1996)).
2.1.2 Pay-As-You-Go
The pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system rests on a so called inter-generational contract. In every period, the
contributions of the current active population ﬁnance the pension entitlements of the retired population.
In theory, the PAYG system constitutes a perfect substitute for private bequests (Barro (1974)). However,
no capital stock is accumulated because old-age provision entirely rests on unfunded intergenerational
transfers. Hence, private savings are crowded out because people save less if they need not to provide for
their own old-age income (Feldstein (1974)).
Compared to capital funding, the PAYG system of old-age provision has two advantages: protec-
tion against the risk of inﬂation and protection against ﬂuctuations of ﬁnancial markets because the
aggregate risk is diversiﬁed over generations (Diamond and Orszag (2005)).7 With capital funding, the
higher expected return on one’s own contributions has to be balanced against the higher riskiness of
these investments (Feldstein (1996)). The risks of PAYG only refer to long-run political factors, future
demographic evolutions and the future of productivity and wages to which contributions and beneﬁts are
related (Miles, Timmermann, de Haan, and Pagano (1999)). The main drawback of the PAYG system
is its dependency on the relative size of the active population (Kotlikoﬀ (1996)). For example, if demo-
graphic changes raise the dependency ratio (i.e. the ratio of retirees per active worker), sustainability of
the system demands either higher individual contributions, lower old-age beneﬁts or an increase in the
minimum retirement age (Disney (2000)).
In a nutshell, the primary costs of the PAYG principle are lower private savings and thus reduced
capital accumulation (Feldstein (1985)). This theoretical conclusion is empirically conﬁrmed by Samwick
(2000) who uses a panel of countries over 25 years to analyze the eﬀects of pension systems on aggregate
savings. Another important cost is the deadweight loss of implicit taxation on labor supply at both the
intensive and the extensive margins (cf. Section 2.2). Altogether, the optimal level of PAYG beneﬁts
solves a trade-of between protection against the risk of elderly poverty and distortions concerning private
savings and labor supply (Feldstein (1985)). However, according to Feldstein (2005a), capital funded
pension systems provide a better solution to this trade-oﬀ.
6Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) argue that the result of Barro (1974) strictly depends on the absence of uncertainty.
Otherwise, an increase in social security will be only partially compensated by a decrease in private savings, which implies
an increase in aggregate savings. There has been substantial research on the eﬀect of social security on private savings.
Although there is no agreement on the magnitude of this eﬀect, most studies suggest that social security reduces the amount
of private savings. Cf. for example Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1981), Feldstein (1982) and Kotlikoﬀ (1979).
7According to Sinn (2004), the PAYG pension system also works as insurance against the risk of not having children
and as an enforcement device for ungrateful children who are unwilling to pay a pension to their parents .
62.1.3 Transition from PAYG to Capital Funding
Nearly all developed countries have adopted a pension system of the PAYG type. In general, pension
systems are ﬁnanced by a payroll tax levied on the labor income of the active population in order to
ﬁnance the retirement beneﬁts of the retired population. The size of these unfunded pension systems
has increased over the last decades. In 1995, old-age provision absorbed 4.5% of GDP in the US, 13% in
Italy, 16.5% in France and over 20% in Sweden (Galasso and Profeta (2002)).
Since the 1970’s, various proposals for pension reform have suggested move the prevalent PAYG
system (at least partially) towards a capital funded system of old-age provision.8 According to these
reform proposals, reallocating resources from the PAYG system to ﬁnancial assets will eliminate many
shortcomings of the current system. First, demographic changes will no longer aﬀect the ﬁnancial viability
of the pension system. Second, the implementation of individual retirement accounts will reduce labor
market distortions. And third, private savings and economic growth will be fostered which implies an
increase in the present value of expected future consumption (Feldstein (2005b)).
However, it is widely accepted that shifting the current PAYG pension systems towards capital funding
would not generally be neutral (Cremer and Pestieau (2000)). Feldstein (2005a) provides a list of four
issues determining whether a shift from unfunded to funded systems of old-age provision will raise social
welfare: (1) the costs of the transition process, (2) the level of administrative costs, (3) the riskiness
of ﬁnancial markets, and (4) the implications for the poorest workers at the bottom of the income
distribution.
The magnitude of the transition costs is controversial in the literature. While Feldstein and Samwick
(1999) and Lindbeck and Persson (2003) estimate moderate costs of moving from PAYG to capital
funding, Miles, Timmermann, de Haan, and Pagano (1999) ﬁnd rather high expenses. By simulating the
eﬀects of diﬀerent pension reforms for Germany and Austria, Fehr (2000) and Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg
(2004) conclude that all reforms redistribute towards future generations at the cost of currently active
generations that have to "pay double".
Instead of moving from PAYG towards capital funding, Diamond and Orszag (2005) propose only
slight changes within the current framework of traditional PAYG, namely a mixture of increased con-
tributions and reduced beneﬁts in order to restore the ﬁnancial sustainability of the pension system.
Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995) derive optimal social security replacement rates and associ-
ated beneﬁts by means of an applied general equilibrium model. According to Boldrin, Dolado, Jimeno,
Peracchi, Breyer, and Fernandez (1999) and Lindbeck and Persson (2003), an eﬃcient pension system
should be a mixture of PAYG and capital funded systems in order to diversify both political risks and the
volatility of ﬁnancial markets. However, if the initial system of old-age provision distorts endogenous labor
supply and provides incentives to retire early, Bovenberg and Sorensen (2004) show that the introduction
of compulsory retirement accounts can be Pareto-improving even in the presence of intragenerational
heterogeneity.
8Cf. Feldstein (1996), Feldstein and Samwick (1999), Feldstein and Samwick (2002), Kotlikoﬀ (1996) and Mitchell and
Zeldes (1996).
72.2 Labor Market Eﬀects of Old-Age Provision
2.2.1 Theoretical Implications of Pension Systems for the Retirement Age
The PAYG system generates an implicit tax on labor supply both at the intensive and the extensive
margins (Keuschnigg (2005)). While labor supply at the intensive margin means the continuous decision
how much to work during the active life, the extensive margin reﬂects a discrete labor supply choice by
comparing costs and beneﬁts of continuing work and postponing retirement by another period.
From an individual perspective, the rate of return on the contributions to the PAYG pension system
is the internal rate of return equal to the sum of population and productivity growth rates which is below
the real interest rate in a dynamically eﬃcient economy (Feldstein (2005b)).9 The demographic change
with declining fertility and increasing life expectancy further reduces the rate of return to the PAYG
system because it strictly depends on the relative size of the active population. The foregone interest
margin is considered as an implicit tax on labor earnings which includes both the payroll marginal tax and
foregone beneﬁts (Cremer, Lozachmeur, and Pestieau (2004)). The size of this implicit tax is proportional
to the diﬀerence between the market rate of interest on private savings and the rate of return on PAYG
contributions. The implicit tax generates distortionary eﬀects on labor supply of active workers, job
search and unemployment.10
At the extensive margin, the implicit tax stems from the fact that most PAYG systems do not
adjust the size of pension beneﬁts in an actuarially fair way (Crémer and Pestieau (2003)). According
to Lau and Poutvaara (2001b), the unfair adjustment of beneﬁts can be interpreted as subsidization of
early retirement. Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests a negative eﬀect of pension contributions on
employment and labor force participation (Scarpetta (1996)).
Whether contributions to a PAYG system are perceived as an implicit tax depends on whether pensions
are linked to own past contributions or not. A PAYG system of the Beveridge type pays a ﬂat pension that
is uncoupled from own contributions. In this case, there is no tax-beneﬁt link at all so that individuals
must perceive their contribution rates as a 100% tax because they receive the same pension anyway
(Feldstein (2005a)). In contrast, a PAYG system of the Bismarck type includes a tax-beneﬁt link that
relates the size of the pension to the size of one’s own contributions in the past. However, contributions
tend to be actuarially unfair so that old-age insurance yields a much lower return than private savings
(Feldstein (2005a)). According to calculations for Germany, about 50% of the contribution is a tax on
labor while the rest is a price for individually received services (Fenge and Werding (2003)).
Without changing the fundamental nature of the PAYG system, the implicit tax can be reduced by
strengthening the individual tax-beneﬁt link, i.e. by relating pensions more closely to one’s own past
contributions (Lindbeck and Persson (2003)). However, the capital funded system computes beneﬁts
in an actuarially fair way by deﬁnition. Hence, it provides the fullest possible tax-beneﬁt link and
thus avoids any type of implicit taxation. Moving to capital funding will not only raise aggregate capital
9This must hold at least in the long-run. Otherwise, intertemporal budget constraints would no longer be deﬁned.
10Demmel and Keuschnigg (2000), Corneo and Marquardt (2000) as well as Keuschnigg (2004) demonstrate that unem-
ployment increases with the level of implicit taxes.
8accumulation, but should also eliminate implicit taxes on extensive and intensive labor supply and thereby
yield important eﬃciency gains leading to lower unemployment, more human capital formation and higher
incomes (Feldstein (2005b)).
2.2.2 Empirical Evidence
There is a considerable literature on the economics of old-age insurance arguing that there is indeed a
small but signiﬁcant impact of pension systems on the average age of retirement and the likelihood of
going on pension.11 For example, Stock and Wise (1990) suggest that increasing the minimum retirement
age from 55 to 60 has reduced the probability of retirement before age 60 by over a third.
Inﬂuential work of Börsch-Supan (2000) and Börsch-Supan (2003) shows the importance of the ex-
tensive margin for Germany. Börsch-Supan (2000) estimates that a decrease of retirement beneﬁts by
12% would decrease the retirement probability of the 60 year old from 39.3% to 28.1% for a given labor
income. According to Gruber and Wise (2005), each year of later retirement should be rewarded by a
6% increase in future beneﬁts for the system to be actuarially fair. Empirical evidence concerning the
sensitivity of the extensive margin is summarized in Diamond and Gruber (1997) and Gruber and Wise
(2005).
2.3 Employment Prospects of Older Workers
In industrialized countries, an increasing number of older workers leaves the labor force at younger and
younger ages. For example, from 1950 to 1989 the labor force participation in the US has declined from
46% to 17% for men over 65 and from 87% to 67% for men between 55 and 64 (Lumsdaine and Wise
(1990)). In some European countries (for example France and Italy), male labor force participation
between 60 and 64 has fallen from above 70% in 1960 to below 20% in 2002 (Conde-Ruiz and Galasso
(2004)).
For older workers, rates of job loss have signiﬁcantly increased in recent years. In the US, the 3-year
job loss rate for workers over age 55 has risen from 11% in 1981 to 16% in 1993 (Farber (1997)). According
to Chan and Stevens (2001), losing a job has signiﬁcant eﬀects on future employment probabilities. Only
61% of displaced men and 55% of displaced women over age 50 are reemployed two years after a job
loss. By using the National Longitudinal Study of Older Men, Diamond and Hausman (1984) conﬁrm
that older men face long periods of unemployment and increased retirement probabilities after a job loss.
Furthermore, an empirical study by CongressionalBudgetOﬃce (1993) shows that about 50% of displaced
workers over age 60 retire and thus leave the labor force.
The employment prospects of older workers strongly depend on the ﬁrms’ incentives to hire and to
employ workers near retirement age (Chan and Stevens (2001)). Unfortunately, ﬁrm behavior has received
11Cf. for example Blau (1994), Burtless and Moﬃtt (1985), Burtless (1986), Fields and Mitchell (1984), Hurd and Boskin
(1984), Hall and Johnson (1980), Mitchell and Fields (1984), Rust and Phelan (1997), Samwick (1998), Mitchell and Phillips
(2000), Crémer and Pestieau (2003) and Stock and Wise (1990). According to Samwick (1998), weak empirical results may
be attributed to cross-sectional variation in retirement beneﬁts.
9much less attention in the retirement literature than the worker’s decision to go on pension. However,
proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms play an active role because they decide on the termination of production by
comparing marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs of employing workers for another time period (Hutchens
(1999)). Hence, Hakola and Uusitalo (2005) conclude that it is important to consider retirement as a
joint decision of workers and ﬁrms.
According to Bingley and Lanot (2004) and Heywood, Ho, and Wei (1999), there are three possible
explanations why the labor market prospects of older workers are reduced compared to those of younger
workers: (1) a decline in the worker’s productivity over time, (2) a steep age-earnings proﬁle due to
delayed compensation schemes, and (3) an increase in the level of non-wage labor costs over time.
As suggested in his life-cycle model of human capital accumulation by Heckman (1976), the worker’s
productivity may decline because his human capital depreciates over time. On the one hand, older
workers have more experience which generally increases productivity. But on the other hand, skills may
decline with age after a certain point so that productivity is reduced (Johnson and Neumark (1997)).
Furthermore, unexpected positive technology shocks may accelerate the skill depreciation of older workers,
which implies that ﬁrm-sponsored retraining is more costly for older workers because the returns to this
investment are recouped over a shorter period of time (Bartel and Sicherman (1993)). Hence, ﬁrms may
use early retirement as a possible way to renew their workforce (Hakola and Uusitalo (2005)).
The empirical evidence concerning the relationship between age and productivity is mixed (Halti-
wanger, Lane, and Spletzer (1999)). In their empirical study for manufacturing ﬁrms in France between
1994 and 1997, Crépon, Deniau, and Pérez-Duarte (2002) ﬁnd that the productivity of older workers
declines by about 10% on average. By using wages as a proxy for individual productivity, Kotlikoﬀ and
Wise (1989) conclude that the productivity of salesmen increases until age 52 and then declines by 16%
until age 60. In a similar study for workers of a trading concern, Kotlikoﬀ and Gokhale (1992) ﬁnd that
there is a productivity loss of nearly 20% compared to the productivity maximum at age 47. An overview
is provided by Börsch-Supan, Duzgun, and Weiss (2005).
Concerning the second explanation for reduced employment prospects of older workers, optimal long-
term labor contracts according to Lazear (1981) imply that low-tenure workers earn less than their
productivity and high-tenure workers earn more than their productivity in order to alleviate the mon-
itoring problems of ﬁrms. However, this upward-sloping wage proﬁle of delayed compensation schemes
introduces a new source of ineﬃciency because workers have an incentive to stay on the job past the
eﬃcient age of retirement (Lazear (1979)). Hence, ﬁrms need to limit the time period during which older
workers receive wages above their productivity (for example by "mandatory retirement") (Leigh (1984)).
This theoretical result is empirically conﬁrmed by Daniel and Heywood (forthcoming) who ﬁnd that in-
dicators of delayed compensation are associated with a reduced likelihood of ﬁrms hiring older workers.
Hence, delayed compensation schemes create incentives to minimize costs by terminating production with
older workers (Heywood, Ho, and Wei (1999)).
With respect to the third explanation, Hutchens (1988) ﬁnds that newly hired older workers are
clustered in a smaller set of occupations than newly hired younger workers and older workers in general.
10Hence, ﬁrms employ older workers but dislike to hire them, which implies that job opportunities are
diminishing with age. This result is empirically conﬁrmed by Chan and Stevens (2001) and can be
attributed to an increase in the level of non-wage labor costs over time. According to Straka (1992),
employer contributions to health insurance negatively aﬀect the employment prospects of older workers.
Because the costs of health insurance are rising with age, the employment prospects of older workers are
reduced compared to those of younger workers (Scott, Berger, and Garen (1995)).12
In our formal analysis, we focus on the third explanation. We assume that the ﬁxed costs of production
increase with the worker’s age over the life-cycle, which implies that it is more costly for the ﬁrm to obtain
the same output with an older worker than with a younger worker of the same initial ability.
2.4 Human Capital Formation
"Human capital" can be deﬁned as knowledge, skills, attitudes, aptitudes, and other acquired traits
contributing to production (Goode (1959)). According to Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, and Sianesi (1999),
there are two main components of human capital with strong complementarity: early ability (whether
acquired or innate) and skills acquired through formal education or training on the job. Human capital
diﬀers from other assets because it yields market returns only in proportion to the worker’s supply of
labor (Hall and Johnson (1980)). An extensive review of the theory of human capital is given by Cahuc
and Zylberberg (2004).
2.4.1 The Investment in Human Capital
In his original approach, Becker (1964) develops a model of individual investment in human capital. In this
view, human capital is similar to "physical means of production". According to Becker (1962), investing in
human capital means "all activities that inﬂuence future real income through the embedding of resources
in people". Human capital investments are expenditures on education, training, health, information, and
labor mobility (Weisbrod (1966)). They involve initial costs (direct tuition expenditures and foregone
earnings during schooling)13 in order to gain a return on this investment in the future (Becker (1992)).14
An important stream of human capital literature deals with the life-cycle of earnings. At the intensive
margin, the individual faces a trade-oﬀ between the costs of producing additional human capital and the
beneﬁts of increased earnings in the future. Models of human capital accumulation over the life-cycle
can be attributed to two diﬀerent branches: earnings maximizing models and utility maximizing models.
While earnings maximizing models abstract from the labor-leisure choice problem and only analyze the
12With respect to the empirical analysis of Scott, Berger, and Garen (1995), Heywood, Ho, and Wei (1999) argue
that the third explanation (increasing non-wage labor costs) cannot be easily disentangled from the second one (delayed
compensation).
13Parsons (1974) distinguishes these major components of education costs.
14This return is based on two interrelated channels: increased earnings for the worker and higher productivity for the
ﬁrm as well as increased employment probabilities (Bloch and Smith (1977)). Bloch and Smith (1977) indeed ﬁnd a
positive correlation of human capital and labor market employment. Also Mincer (1989) states that the probability of
being unemployed decreases with the amount of education. In a nutshell, there are two key determinants of the return to
education: the costs of education and the employment opportunities after education (Rephann (2002)).
11trade-oﬀ between investment and income (for example Ben-Porath (1967)), utility maximizing models
also incorporate the labor-leisure choice so that labor supply becomes endogenous to the model (for
example Heckman (1976)).15
In a nutshell, Mincer (1970) and Mincer (1997) summarize the empirical evidence concerning the age-
earnings proﬁle of individuals. Earnings positively depend on the stock of human capital; the age-earnings
proﬁle is concave and at least for a long time upward-sloping. If human capital investment increases,
the age-earnings proﬁle becomes steeper and has its maximum later. Hence, human capital investments
determine the shape of individual earnings over the life-cycle.
2.4.2 Implications of Pension Systems for Human Capital Formation
According to Echevarría (2003), the return to human capital investments is aﬀected by the pension
system if ﬁnite horizon economies are considered. With a tax-beneﬁt link, the return to education is not
restricted to increased labor incomes, but also extends to pensions during retirement. Hence, if workers
decide on the optimal amount of human capital investments, they take into account not only the eﬀect
on future labor incomes but also on future retirement beneﬁts (Echevarría and Iza (2005)).
Lau and Poutvaara (2001a) and Lau and Poutvaara (2001b) study the impact of social security
incentives on human capital formation, arguing that actuarial fairness and a tight tax-beneﬁt link increase
human capital along with an increase in the retirement age. This is a common result in most theoretical
analyses because postponed retirement lengthens the time period at the extensive margin over which
individuals can appropriate the beneﬁts from human capital investments, which translates into higher
returns to education (Trostel (1993)). Hence, the return to education positively depends on the remaining
active years. In a nutshell, postponed retirement raises aggregate human capital because higher returns
to education are associated with increased human capital investments (Echevarría (2003)).
In their analysis of demographic transition and economic growth, Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil
(2000) show in an OLG framework that augmented life expectancy gives rise to increased human capital
formation. In a similar setup, de la Croix and Licandro (1999b) investigate an economy where the workers
accumulate human capital as a function of their optimal schooling period. The eﬀect of lower mortality
rates on human capital formation is positive because the increased expected ﬂow of future incomes will
increase human capital per capita. The same result is obtained by Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro
(2002) under a setting with uncertain lifetime horizon and endogenous retirement age. Echevarría (2003)
argues that an increase in life expectancy translates into higher growth rates by increased human capital
formation only if demographic change is accompanied by simultaneous increments in the length of the
working life. Hence, if there is a positive correlation between life expectancy and retirement age, an
increase in life expectancy will foster the formation of human capital. For the UK, this result is empirically
conﬁrmed by Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000).
15The diﬀerence between these two types of models is illustrated by Snow and Warren (1990) who explain that the income
eﬀect of higher wages (due to investments in human capital) on future labor supply may reduce realized future earnings.
However, there are eﬀorts to integrate these two branches, for example by Blinder and Weiss (1976). Weiss (1986) provides
a review of the theoretical literature.
12In a nutshell, because the PAYG pension system generates distortions in labor supply and thus
provides incentives for early retirement, aggregate human capital is lower than with a capital funded
system of old-age provision. The reason is that the PAYG system discourages human capital formation
both directly and indirectly via the retirement age (Echevarría and Iza (2005)). Moving the pension
system from PAYG towards capital funding eliminates the distortions in the labor market and thus
increases the workers’ retirement age and the investment in human capital (Feldstein (2005b)).
Furthermore, the positive relationship between retirement age and human capital accumulation also
holds in the opposite direction. According to Hernoes, Sollie, and Strom (2000), education is an important
determinant of the retirement age. A higher stock of human capital increases the retirement age because
the worker’s higher productivity implies increased labor incomes and makes labor supply more worthwhile
compared to retirement. Hence, while early retirement is low among high-skilled workers, low-skilled
workers may take the opportunity to retire at the lowest possible date.
Before analyzing two proposals for pension reform in Sections 5 and 6, we discuss the assumptions of
our model (cf. Section 3) and the current pension system with traditional PAYG (cf. Section 4) in order
to point out the analytical basis of comparison.
3 The Model
We consider a discrete-time model with two types of agents, namely workers and ﬁrms. In line with
Feldstein (1985), there are two periods with ﬁxed length. As modelled by Crémer and Pestieau (2003)
and Lau and Poutvaara (2001b), the ﬁrst period is fully active while the second period is endogenously
split into a working subperiod and a retirement subperiod. In line with Lau and Poutvaara (2001a),
the model allows for endogenous human capital formation that is limited to the ﬁrst period. Production
takes place in worker-ﬁrm pairs and no capital is needed.
At the beginning of period 1, each ﬁrm meets one worker whose individual ability is drawn randomly
from a distribution that is common knowledge. In the second period, all workers are employed regularly
until at least one party decides to separate, either the worker or the ﬁrm. In line with Acemoglu and
Pischke (1999), there is no exogenous separation after the ﬁrst period.16 The remaining time of period
2 deﬁnes the length of the retirement subperiod. Altogether, the economy evolves over time as shown in
ﬁgure 1. The model assumptions and the labor market decisions of ﬁrms and workers are described in
the following subsections.
16Incorporating an exogenous separating probability as in Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (2003) does not change our
analytical results because we focus on the supply side of the labor market. For the workers who face the training decision
in period 1, it is irrelevant whether their higher wages in period 2 are paid by their current or by another employer.
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Figure 1: Evolution over Time
3.1 The Workers
By assumption, each worker meets one ﬁrm that can unambiguously observe the workers’ ability.17 In
line with Crémer and Pestieau (2003) and Jensen, Lau, and Poutvaara (2004), there are two types of
workers with individual ability θi = {θL,θH} at the beginning of period 1 and identical lifetime (1 + h).
The length of period 1 is normalized to unity. The length of period 2 is equal to h and covers both a
working and a retirement subperiod. In line with Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (2003), workers are
risk-neutral and maximize the sum of their discounted utilities over both periods:
U (θi) = u1i + δu2i (1)
The discount factor δ ≡ 1
1+r with r as the market interest rate expresses the preference for current
and future welfare. The higher δ, the higher is the weighting of the following periods and the lower is the
preference for period 1.
In period 1, worker can invest in their stock of human capital.18 In line with Lau and Poutvaara
(2001a), the individual level of human capital depends on the amount of resources devoted to the process
of educational production. As shown in equation (5), the training costs χ(ei) disproportionately increase
with the training intensity ei. In line with the literature on human capital accumulation over the life-
cycle, the training costs have to be borne by the worker.19 Furthermore, the worker can transfer wealth
from period 1 to period 2 by reducing his consumption c1i and saving an amount s1i.
17This assumption is in line with Boone and Bovenberg (2006). Furthermore, it is implicitly included into the whole
literature on human capital and the life-cycle of earnings. Each worker oﬀers his individual stock of human capital to the
ﬁrms and is rewarded by a rental price per unit of human capital. Hence, we rule out asymmetric information (hidden
knowledge). If the worker’s productivity were not observed by the ﬁrm, there would be adverse selection as modeled e.g.
by DeMeza and Webb (2001).
18This is an advancement compared to Martín (2003) who excludes human capital investments by assuming an exogenous
distribution of education types.
19Most models that analyze the accumulation of human capital over the life-cycle completely concentrate on the investment
decision of workers. Cf. for example Ben-Porath (1967) and Heckman (1976).
14Altogether, the worker’s utility in the ﬁrst period is equal to20
u1i = c1i − χ(ei) (2)
c1i = (1 − τ)w1i − s1i (3)





In both periods, the worker’s wage corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of oligopolistic labor
markets. According to Acemoglu (1997), the parameter 0 < β < 1 indicates the (identical) bargaining
power of workers concerning the division of output. Hence, there are labor market frictions because the
worker’s wage is below his marginal product (Masters (1998)). By deﬁning the output good as numéraire
and assuming an identical, linear one-to-one production function for the connection of output and labor
(which is the only factor of production), the wage of worker i in period 1 depends on his productivity in
the following manner: w1i = βθi. The net wage is equal to the diﬀerence between the wage wi and the
proportional contributions τwi.
In period 2, the worker’s productivity increases to θ
′
i = (1 + ei)θi depending on the training intensity
in the ﬁrst period. Hence, in line with Lau and Poutvaara (2001a), there is no uncertainty about the return
to education.21 The labor income in period 2 is equal to the product of the worker’s wage w2i = βθ
′
i and
labor supply ti. The worker endogenously determines ti that deﬁnes the length of the working subperiod
and thus the date of retirement. As deﬁned in equation (10), there are eﬀort costs of labor ϕ(ti) which
increase with ti (Crémer and Pestieau (2003)).22
20In line with Ben-Porath (1967), we do not analyze a more general utility function of workers. Note that the wage
corresponds to the worker’s labor income because labor supply is implicitly normalized to unity. By assumption, there are
no eﬀort costs of labor in period 1.
21Because ei determines the amount of training in period 1 as well as the increased productivity in period 2, it constitutes
the key determinant of the return to education as analyzed in the theory of human capital (c.f. Mincer (1974)).
The probability of a match in period 2 may explicitly depend on the worker’s status of employment in period 1. Diﬀerent
matching probabilities can be justiﬁed by diﬀerent frictions in searching for employment. Mincer (1989) empirically conﬁrms
that the probability of unemployment decreases with education. In this context, Brown and Kaufold (1988) stress that the
possibility of unemployment reduces the expected return to education. In a nutshell, the worker’s return to education is
based on higher productivity as well as higher employment probability (Bloch and Smith (1977)). For simplicity, we assume
no search frictions and thus the same matching probability for all workers.
22Mitchell and Fields (1984) stress that, in addition to the income opportunities as deﬁned by the beneﬁt rule, the worker’s
preferences for income relative to leisure are the most important determinant of the retirement age.
15Hence, the worker’s utility in the second period is equal to
u2i = c2i − ϕ(ti) + c′
2i (6)












2i = (h − ti)b + s2i (11)
b = m(ti)k + n(ti)[(1 + p)τw1i + τtiw2i] (12)
While c2i denotes the period 2 consumption of worker i during the working subperiod, c′
2i refers to
the level of consumption during the retirement subperiod. Consumption c2i is composed of three parts:
net labor income (1 − τ)tiw2i, private savings from period 1, and private savings s2i from the working
subperiod which reduce c2i by transferring wealth to the retirement subperiod. Note that the amount of
private savings s1i is augmented by the factor R = (1 + r). In the retirement subperiod, consumption c′
2i
is composed of private savings s2i as well as old-age beneﬁts b. The retirement subperiod has the length
(h − ti) because it starts at date (1 + ti) and continues until the worker dies at date (1 + h).
According to Keuschnigg (2006), old-age beneﬁts are determined by the beneﬁt rule as speciﬁed in
equation (12). In general, they are composed of two parts. The ﬁrst part refers to the pension system
of the Beveridge type which pays a ﬂat pension k uncoupled from own contributions. The second part
refers to the Bismarck type and includes a tax-beneﬁt link that relates the size of the pension b to the
size of one’s own contributions in periods 1 and 2. Social security contributions are equal to payroll taxes
τ that are proportional to the worker’s labor income. Note that the parameter p may be smaller than the
market interest rate r. Whether contributions are actuarially fair depends on the parameters m(ti) and
n(ti) that deﬁne to which extent individual beneﬁts are adjusted in response to the retirement decision
ti.
Altogether, the total utility of a worker with ability θi is obtained by substituting equations (2) to
(11) into equation (1):





(1 − τ)tiβ (1 + ei)θi −
γ
2
(ti)2 + (h − ti)b
 
(13)
b = m(ti)k + n(ti)[(1 + p)τw1i + τtiw2i]
Note that private savings cancel out because they are increased and discounted by the same market
interest rate r. Hence, they only represent transfers from one period to another without inﬂuence on
total utility. In line with Lau and Poutvaara (2001a), total utility is separable in lifetime consumption
and lifetime leisure.
163.2 The Retirement and Training Decision with Laissez-Faire (LF)
Without government interventions, there are no social security contributions and no old-age beneﬁts.
Hence, the parameters τ and b are equal to zero. Each worker maximizes the present value of his total














The ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC) are the following:
ti : δβ(1 + ei)θi = δγti (15)
ei : δtiβθi = ei (16)
The FOC compare the marginal beneﬁts (on the left hand side) and the marginal costs (on the right
hand side) of an increase in ti and ei, respectively. Equation (15) represents the worker’s optimization
problem with respect to ti. While the additional eﬀort costs of labor are shown on the RHS, the increase
in labor income is equal to β(1 + ei)θi which corresponds to the wage in the second period. In equation
(16), each additional unit of training generates costs equal to ei, but this investment makes the worker
more productive and thus increases the labor income in period 2 by tiβθi.
Furthermore, equations (15) and (16) represent the optimal values ti = RLF (ei) and ei = RLF (ti) as
a function of the other decision variable:
ti = RLF (ei) =
βθi
γ
(1 + ei) (17)
ei = RLF (ti) = δβθiti (18)
The optimality functions (17) and (18) are upward sloping in a (ei,ti)-diagram. Hence, retirement age
and training intensity constitute complements concerning the worker’s optimal choice of labor supply and
human capital formation.23 Additionally, both ti and ei positively depend on the individual ability θi.
This theoretical result is in line with the empirical ﬁndings of Fields and Mitchell (1984) who suggest that
those gaining more by postponing retirement will retire later. In ﬁgure 2, the two optimality functions
are graphically illustrated for both ability types of workers.
In order to determine the optimal retirement age and the optimal training intensity for the worker
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Figure 2: The Workers with Laissez-Faire










γ − δ (βθi)
2 (20)
With laissez-faire, the worker’s optimal values for retirement age and training increase with the
bargaining power β and the ability θi because these parameters determine the wage and thus the beneﬁts
of both training in period 1 and work in period 2.25 This result is in line with Cremer, Lozachmeur,
and Pestieau (2004) and Martín (2003) who suggest that workers with high productivity will retire later.
Furthermore, both (ti)
LF and (ei)
LF increase with δ because an increase in δ is equivalent to a decrease
in r. Hence, the additional income in period 2 is discounted less and thus weighted to a greater extent. As
suggested by Lau and Poutvaara (2001a), the comparative statics are stronger for (ti)
LF than for (ei)
LF
because the retirement age is aﬀected both directly and indirectly via the impact on human capital.
However, both variables decrease with γ because higher eﬀort costs of labor imply that the net marginal
beneﬁts of work and education are reduced.
24The calculation of the optimal values for retirement age and training intensity with laissez-faire is presented in Appendix
A. Concerning the following sections, the calculation of the optimal values proceeds in the same manner.
25Note that there are two opposite eﬀects of individual ability on the retirement age, an income eﬀect with negative
correlation and a substitution eﬀect with positive correlation (Jensen, Lau, and Poutvaara (2004)).
183.3 The Firms
As modeled by Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (2003), ﬁrms are risk-neutral and maximize the sum
of their discounted proﬁts over both periods:26
π(θi) = π1i + δπ2i (21)
In both periods, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is equal to the diﬀerence between revenue and costs per worker. In
period 1, the proﬁt corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution:
π1i = (1 − β)θi (22)
In the second period, each ﬁrm decides how long production with the worker is continued. The ﬁrm
leaves the market at the separation date tF, which implies that production is terminated. Because the
ﬁrm has to bear ﬁxed costs of production ψ
 
θi,tF 
, proﬁts in period 2 are equal to












As shown in equation (24), the ﬁxed costs of production increase with tF because non-wage labor
costs are rising over time (cf. Section 2.3). Hence, it is more costly for the ﬁrm to obtain the same output
with an older worker than with a younger worker of the same initial ability.
Altogether, total proﬁts of a ﬁrm are obtained by substituting equations (22) to (24) into (21):
π(θi) = (1 − β)θi + δ
 






3.4 The Separation Decision of the Firms
The ﬁrm is not aﬀected by the system of old-age provision which implies that it solves the same decision
problem with laissez-faire and with a pension system, respectively. Hence, the ﬁrm always maximizes
total proﬁts in (25) with respect to the separation date tF:
max
tF (1 − β)θi + δ
 






The ﬁrm’s FOC is equal to




26The production function exhibits constant returns to scale. Hence, from the ﬁrm’s point of view, the worker’s ability can










Figure 3: The Separation Decision of the Firms
This FOC compares the marginal revenue (on the left hand side) and the marginal costs (on the right
hand side) of an increase in tF. While production in period 2 generates a marginal revenue equal to the
Nash bargaining solution (1 − β)(1 + ei)θi, there are additional ﬁxed costs that have to be borne by the
ﬁrm. By solving the FOC (27) for tF, we obtain the optimal separation date of the ﬁrm as a function of






Note that ei corresponds to the optimal level of training chosen by the worker. In the case of laissez-
faire, it is determined by the optimality function in equation (16). The optimal separation date of the
ﬁrm increases with ei and θi because the worker’s productivity and thus the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are augmented.
Hence, not only the worker’s optimal retirement age (cf. Section 3.2) but also the ﬁrm’s optimal separation
date positively depend on the worker’s productivity. In this context, Lazear (1979) suggests that the
worker’s education is positively correlated with the ﬁrm’s age of mandatory retirement. However, tF (ei)
decreases with f because higher ﬁxed costs of production make it is less proﬁtable to employ the worker.
Obviously, tF (ei) decreases with β because the ﬁrm’s output share is equal to (1 − β).
204 The Pension System
4.1 The Retirement and Training Decision with a Pension System
With a pension system, each worker has to pay contributions during his working life and receives retire-
ment beneﬁts b that depends on the type of the pension system. In general, each worker maximizes his
total utility subject to the beneﬁt rule deﬁned by the system of old-age provision:
max
ei,ti





(1 − τ)tiβ (1 + ei)θi −
γ
2
(ti)2 + (h − ti)b
 
(29)
s.t. b = m(ti)k + n(ti)[(1 + p)τw1i + τtiw2i] (30)
The FOC are the following:
ti : δ
 




= δ [γti + b] (31)
ei : δ
 





As in the situation with laissez-faire, the FOC compare the marginal beneﬁts (on the left hand side)
and the marginal costs (on the right hand side) of an increase in ti and ei, respectively. In equation
(31), the marginal beneﬁts of an increase in ti are modiﬁed compared to (15). First, the wage for an
additional unit of labor supply is decreased by the contributions τ. And second, if the retirement beneﬁts
are adjusted in response to the length of the working subperiod, b increases with ti. Furthermore, the
marginal costs on the RHS are increased because the worker forgoes the retirement beneﬁts b during
the additional unit of working time. In equation (32), the marginal beneﬁts of an increase in ei are
modiﬁed compared to laissez-faire in (16). First, the additional labor income in period 2 is reduced by
the contributions. And second, if the pension system contains a link between contributions and beneﬁts,
more training increases the level of beneﬁts during the retirement subperiod.
Starting from the FOC (31) and (32), we can determine the implicit tax rates τ∗
t on labor supply at
the extensive margin and τ∗
e on training intensity at the intensive margin:27
(1 − τ∗





t = τ +












e = τ −




27According to Gruber and Wise (2005), the implicit tax on labor supply at the extensive margin is equal to the ratio of
the change in the present value of retirement beneﬁts and labor income.
21Compared to the situation with laissez-faire in Section 3.2, both implicit tax rates indicate the degree
of distortion with respect to the worker’s retirement and training decision.
4.2 The Retirement and Training Decision with Traditional PAYG
With a PAYG system of old-age provision, social security contributions are not treated like private savings
and beneﬁts are not refunded from the stock of own savings (cf. Section 2.1.2). In most countries, the
current PAYG pension system represents a mixture of the Beveridge type and the Bismarck type with
actuarially fair adjustment of beneﬁts. In the following, this mixture is analyzed in detail because it
constitutes the analytical basis of comparison for evaluating the proposals for pension reform in Sections
5 and 6.
With the Beveridge type system, beneﬁts are completely uncoupled from own contributions and
independent of the length of the working life:28
bBeveridge = k (35)
However, beneﬁts according to the Bismarck type depend on the worker’s contributions during his




[τβθi + tiτβ (1 + ei)θi] (36)
The beneﬁts in (36) are actuarially adjusted because they are divided by (h − ti), the length of
the retirement subperiod. In this context, the parameter α provides a measure of the tax-beneﬁt link
because it determines to which extent the retirement beneﬁts depend on one’s own contributions in the
past. However, in contradiction to capital funding contributions of period 1 are not augmented by the
market interest rate, which implies p = 0 in equation (30).
Altogether, we assume that the traditional PAYG system of old-age provision pays beneﬁts equal to29
bPAY G = bBeveridge + bBismarck (37)
The two parts of this beneﬁt rule (37) focus on diﬀerent socioeconomic goals. While the Beveridge
part of the pension system provides a basic pension in order to prevent poverty, the Bismarck part pays
earnings-related beneﬁts in order to sustain the worker’s previous standard of living (Jensen, Lau, and
Poutvaara (2004)). In a nutshell, the ﬂat pension bBeveridge represents the level of minimum pension
which is also granted if the worker has never stayed inside the labor market.
28The latter property implies m(ti) = 1 in the beneﬁt rule (30).
29According to the propositions by Boskin, Kotlikoﬀ, Puﬀert, and Shoven (1986), this two-pillar structure may be referred
to as the "Boskin Proposal" (Huggett and Ventura (1999)).
22Subject to (37), the FOC (31) and (32) are the following:
ti : δ
 
(1 − τ)β(1 + ei)θi + ατβθi





γti + bPAY G 
(38)
ei : δ [ti (1 − τ)βθi + αtiτβθi] = ei (39)
Equation (38) represents the worker’s optimization problem with respect to ti. The two marginal
beneﬁts of extending the working subperiod are the additional net labor income (1 − τ)β(1+ei)θi plus a
second term which represents the increase in the level of retirement beneﬁts. Obviously, this increase in
the level of beneﬁts depends on α, the strength of the tax-beneﬁt link. On the left hand side in equation
(39), there are two marginal beneﬁts of an increase in ei. First, more training generates additional net
income in period 2. And second, the retirement beneﬁts are augmented by the product of additional
contributions in period 2 and the strength of the tax-beneﬁt link.
As in Section 3.2, the FOC (38) and (39) represent the optimality functions ti = RPAY G (ei) and
ei = RPAY G (ti) with traditional PAYG:
ti = RPAY G (ei) = (1 − (1 − α)τ)
βθi
γ




ei = RPAY G (ti) = δ (1 − (1 − α)τ)βθiti (41)
Compared to the situation with laissez-faire in (17), the optimality function ti = RPAY G (ei) is
aﬀected twice. First, it is twisted downward because the marginal beneﬁts of labor supply in period 2
are reduced by the factor (1 − (1 − α)τ), that part of the retirement beneﬁts which is not adjusted in
an actuarially fair way. And second, it is shifted downward because the Beveridge part of the beneﬁts is
independent of the worker’s past contributions. Furthermore, the optimality function ei = RPAY G (ti)
is twisted upward because the marginal beneﬁts of training are scaled down. These modiﬁcations of the
optimality functions are illustrated in ﬁgure 4.
Combining equations (38) and (39) yields
(ti)
PAY G =
(1 − (1 − α)τ)βθi − k
γ − δ [(1 − (1 − α)τ)βθi]
2 (42)
(ei)
PAY G = δ (1 − (1 − α)τ)βθi (ti)
PAY G (43)
As with laissez-faire, the worker’s optimal values for retirement age and training increase with the
bargaining power β, the ability θi, and the discount factor δ while they decrease with γ, the eﬀort costs
of labor. Furthermore, (ti)
PAY G and (ei)
PAY G decrease with τ and k because these components of the
pension system reduce the net marginal returns to labor supply and education. Hence, cutting the payroll
tax rate or the Beveridge type beneﬁts will, ceteris paribus, postpone retirement. This result is in line with
Martín (2003) who suggests that especially the retirement age of low-skilled workers is distorted by the
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Figure 4: The Workers with Traditional PAYG
Lau, and Poutvaara (2004), strengthening the tax-beneﬁt link implies an increase in the parameter α,
which fosters human capital formation and increases the worker’s retirement age.
With traditional PAYG, (ti)
PAY G and (ei)
PAY G are smaller than with laissez-faire because there is
an implicit tax on extensive labor supply of older generations near retirement and on training intensity
at the intensive margin:
(τ∗
t)











PAY G = (1 − α)τ (45)
The implicit tax on labor supply in (44) is composed of two eﬀects which are both generated by the
pension system if there is no perfect tax-beneﬁt link and the adjustment of beneﬁts is not actuarially
fair. First, for α < 1 the tax-beneﬁt link is imperfect because additional contributions do not fully
translate into higher retirement beneﬁts. And second, the Beveridge type component of the pension
system implies that the individual labor income is reduced without proportionally increasing the level of
retirement beneﬁts. Hence, each worker forgoes beneﬁts k by postponing retirement for another unit of
time. In line with Crémer and Pestieau (2003), the implicit tax rate increases with k but decreases with
θi.
As a borderline case, the traditional PAYG system manages to mimic the capital funded system of
old-age provision. For α = 1 and k = 0, the worker has the same incentives as with laissez-faire and
chooses his optimal values for retirement age and training intensity according to (19) and (20). In this
case, the implicit tax rates (44) and (45) are equal to zero and the pension system is referred to as
24neutral or actuarially fair (Cremer, Lozachmeur, and Pestieau (2004)). This result is in line with Lau
and Poutvaara (2001b) who suggest that the best PAYG pension system is of the Bismarck type with
actuarially fair adjustment of beneﬁts.
4.3 The Current Situation with Traditional PAYG
Both workers and ﬁrms decide how long they want to produce in the second period. Depending on the
worker’s training intensity, the optimal separation date of the ﬁrm is described in equation (28). In period
2, the termination of production (ti)
∗ for ability type θi is deﬁned by the smaller of the two values in









Subject to (41), it is the worker (and not the ﬁrm) who deﬁnes the end of production in period 2 if
(ti)
PAY G ≤ (ti)
F







β (1 + ei)θi
(47)













Hence, condition (47) is unambiguously satisﬁed for the ability type H, which implies that the sepa-
ration date (tH)





(1 − (1 − α)τ)βθH − k
γ − δ [(1 − (1 − α)τ)βθH]
2 (49)
The strength of the tax-beneﬁt link (α) determines whether (47) is also satisﬁed for the ability type
L. If the tax-beneﬁt link is weak (i.e. α is small), condition (47) is also satisﬁed for the ability type L.
However, if the tax-beneﬁt link is strong (i.e. α is large), it is the ﬁrm that determines the termination
of production in period 2 because the optimality function tL = RPAY G (eL) moves upwards such that
the ﬁrm’s separation date (tL)
F falls below the worker’s retirement age (tL)
PAY G.
In the following, we assume that α is suﬃciently small, which implies that also the separation date
(tL)




(1 − (1 − α)τ)βθL − k
γ − δ[(1 − (1 − α)τ)βθL]
2 (50)
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Figure 5: The Traditional PAYG Pension System
Because the retirement age corresponds to the worker’s optimization, the training intensity of both
ability types corresponds to the worker’s optimal value in (43):
(eH)
∗ = (eH)




PAY G = δ (1 − (1 − α)τ)βθL (tL)
PAY G (52)
5 Pension Reform I: Implementation of Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRA)
Policy discussions often propose to move from the traditional PAYG system to capital funding or at
least to a mixed system comprising both a PAYG and a capital funded pillar (Kirchgässner (2005)). As
discussed in Section 2.2.1, the capital funded system provides the fullest possible tax-beneﬁt link and
computes beneﬁts in an actuarially fair way by deﬁnition. In a nutshell, it avoids any type of implicit
taxation and thus constitutes a perfect substitute for private savings.




[Rτβθi + tiτβ (1 + ei)θi] (53)
Capital funding implies that the sum of all contributions during the working life is refunded as annuities
after the retirement. The contributions of period 1 are augmented by the factor R = (1 + r).
Starting from the traditional PAYG system of old-age provision as discussed in Section 4.3, we analyze
26the implementation of individual retirement accounts and the impacts on labor supply and human capital
formation. Individual retirement accounts represent the capital funded pillar of the pension system
according to (53). Suppose that ω is the proportion of beneﬁts generated by individual retirement
accounts and thus a measure for the degree of capital funding of the pension system.30
Hence, total beneﬁts bIRA with individual retirement accounts are equal to
bIRA = ωbCF + (1 − ω)bPAY G (54)
bPAY G = k +
α
h − ti
τβθi [1 + ti (1 + ei)] (55)
5.1 The Retirement and Training Decision with Individual Retirement Ac-
counts
Starting from (38) and (39), the worker’s FOC are the following:
ti : δ
 

























The interpretation of the FOC is similar to the general decision problem in Section 4.1. However,
the retirement beneﬁts are composed of two parts that correspond to the diﬀerent pillars of the pension
system and are included by the weights ω and (1 − ω), respectively. Applying the beneﬁt rules (53) and
(55) yields the optimality functions
ti = RIRA (ei) = [1 − (1 − ω)(1 − α)τ]
βθi
γ




ei = RIRA (ti) = δ [1 − (1 − ω)(1 − α)τ]βθiti (59)
The worker’s optimality functions are graphically illustrated in ﬁgure 6. Compared to the situation
with traditional PAYG in (40), the optimality function ti = RIRA (ei) is aﬀected twice. It is twisted
upward and shifted upward because both the tax-beneﬁt link and the degree of actuarial adjustment
are increased by the capital funded pillar of the pension system. Furthermore, ei = RIRA (ti) is twisted
downward because the marginal beneﬁts of training are augmented.
Combining (58) and (59) yields
(ti)
IRA =
ξ (ω)βθi − (1 − ω)k
γ − δ [ξ (ω)βθi]
2 (60)
(ei)
IRA = δξ (ω)βθi (ti)
IRA (61)
30In fact, most PAYG systems determine the division of contributions rather than the division of beneﬁts. In this case,
ω is related to τ and the division of bIRA is endogenously determined by the diﬀerent returns to the capital funded pillar
and the PAYG pillar of the pension system. Because the return to capital funding corresponds to the market rate of return
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Figure 6: The Workers with Individual Retirement Accounts
with ξ (ω) ≡ 1 − (1 − ω)(1 − α)τ.
The implicit tax rates are equal to
(τ∗
t)
IRA = (1 − ω)












IRA = (1 − ω)(1 − α)τ (63)




IRA decrease with ω because distortions are reduced by moving
towards capital funding. If there are no individual retirement accounts (i.e. ω = 0), (ti)
IRA and (ei)
IRA
are equal to the optimal values of the pure PAYG system according to (42) and (43). If the pension


















5.2 The Eﬀects of Individual Retirement Accounts
Similar to (46) for the traditional PAYG system, the termination of production in period 2 for ability




















β (1 + ei)θi
(65)
Because of (48), this condition is unambiguously satisﬁed for the ability type H, which implies that
the separation date (tH)





ξ (ω)βθH − (1 − ω)k
γ − δ[ξ (ω)βθH]
2 (66)
The degree of capital funding (ω) determines whether (65) is also satisﬁed for the ability type L. If
the capital funded pillar is weak (i.e. ω is small), condition (65) is also satisﬁed for the ability type L. In
this case, the separation date of ability type L also corresponds to the worker’s optimal retirement age
in (60). However, if the capital funded pillar is strong (i.e. ω is large), it is the ﬁrm that determines the
termination of production in period 2 because the optimality function tL = RIRA (eL) moves upwards
such that the ﬁrm’s separation date (tL)




F for ω = 0 (this is the case of traditional PAYG) and (tL)
IRA > (tL)
F for
ω = 1 (cf. Appendix B.2), there must be some critical level ¯ ω such that for ω > ¯ ω the ﬁrm’s separation
date (tL)
F falls below the worker’s retirement age (tL)
IRA. Therefore, if the capital funded pillar is
strong (i.e. ω > ¯ ω), it is the ﬁrm that determines (tL)
∗, the termination of production in period 2. In
this case, (tL)
F is obtained by substituting the optimality function (59) into equation (28) and solving
for t.
Altogether, the separation date (tL)













f−δξ(ω)β(1−β)(θL)3 if ω > ¯ ω
(67)
For ω > ¯ ω, the implementation of individual retirement accounts is graphically illustrated in ﬁgure 7.
Furthermore, the training intensity of both ability types is determined by substituting the separation
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Figure 7: The Eﬀecs of Individual Retirement Accounts
5.3 Interpretation
The introduction of individual retirement accounts implies that the implicit tax on labor supply and
training is reduced. This can be seen by comparing the implicit tax rates with traditional PAYG in (44)
and (45) and with individual retirement accounts in (62) and (63). As a consequence, human capital
formation is increased and retirement is postponed. These results are in line with Lau and Poutvaara
(2001a). However, concentrating on the worker’s retirement and training decision in (60) and (61) and
neglecting the production side of the economy may be misleading in evaluating the welfare gains of
individual retirement accounts.
The eﬀects of pension reforms also depend on labor market prospects of older workers near retirement
age. These labor market prospects positively depend on the worker’s ability. While high-ability workers
indeed react to the introduction of individual retirement accounts according to (66) and (68), low-ability
workers may be restricted by the ﬁrm’s decision to terminate production. If the capital funded pillar of the
pension system becomes strong, low-ability workers may not attain their optimal retirement age because
ﬁrms refuse to employ them any longer. For ω > ¯ ω, the separation date of ability type L is determined
by (tL)
F, which implies that the separation date increases to a much lower extent than suggested by the
worker’s optimal retirement age (tL)
IRA.
Depending on the level of ω, the eﬀects of strengthening the capital funded pillar for low-ability







∂ω if ω ≤ ¯ ω
∂(tL)F
∂ω if ω > ¯ ω
(70)
The separation date (tL)
∗ unambiguously increases with ω because also the ﬁrm’s optimal separation
30date (tL)
F positively depends on ω. The latter increases with ω because human capital formation is
encouraged and so the ﬁrm can increase its proﬁts by extending the time of production in period 2.
However, the comparative statics of (tL)
IRA and (tL)










Hence, for ω > ¯ ω, there is a gap between the optimal retirement age of low-ability workers and the
actual separation date due to the ﬁrm’s decision to terminate production. This gap increases with ω and
has its maximum for ω = 1. As a consequence, the ratio of retirees per active worker is reduced by less
than suggested by the worker’s incentives to go on pension.
For ω = 1, the pension system is completely moved towards capital funding which implies that the
worker has the same incentives as in the case of laissez-faire and chooses his optimal values for retirement
age and training intensity according to (19) and (20). However, these values are not feasible once the
separation decision of the ﬁrms is controlled for.
6 Pension Reform II: Increasing the Minimum Retirement Age
(MR)
Postponed retirement is generally considered to be a key policy response to population aging because the
ratio of retirees per active worker is reduced without changing the nature of the PAYG system (Lindbeck
and Persson (2003)). In this context, EuropeanCommission (2001) concludes that increasing the eﬀective
retirement age to 65 will signiﬁcantly limit the necessary increase in the social security contributions in
the period between 2000 and 2050 (from 16% to 20.5% instead of 27%). Hence, a second proposal for
pension reform refers to an increase in the minimum retirement age (for example Sayan and Kiraci (2001)
and Gruber and Wise (2005)).
In our model, the minimum retirement age represents the lowest age of eligibility. Hence, workers
are not allowed to choose a retirement age below the minimum retirement age ¯ t. This lower bound ¯ t
is identical for all workers and thus independent of their individual ability. In a nutshell, the minimum
retirement age implies that workers face an additional restriction with respect to their retirement decision.
6.1 The Retirement and Training Decision with Minimum Retirement Age
In general, the decision problem of the workers remains the same as with traditional PAYG. Hence, the
worker’s optimal values for retirement age and training intensity are deﬁned by (42) and (43). However,









PAY G ≤ ¯ t, the retirement restriction is binding for the ability type θi so that the worker’s
retirement age is equal to
(ti)
MR = ¯ t (73)
In this case, the training intensity with ¯ t is described by the optimality function (41):
(ei)
MR = δ(1 − (1 − α)τ)βθi¯ t = ¯ ei (74)
6.2 The Eﬀects of Increasing the Minimum Retirement Age
If the minimum retirement age is not binding (i.e. for (ti)
PAY G > ¯ t), the separation date is the same as
with traditional PAYG in (49) for the ability type H and in (50) for the ability type L. However, if the









Hence, it is the ﬁrm that deﬁnes the separation date if
(ti)
F ≤ ¯ t (76)








PAY G if ¯ t < (ti)
PAY G
¯ t if (ti)
PAY G ≤ ¯ t < (ti)
F
(ti)
F if ¯ t ≥ (ti)
F
(77)
For example, if the minimum retirement age ¯ t lies between the ﬁrm’s separation dates for ability type
L and H, i.e. (tL)
F < ¯ t < (tH)
F, the situation for the ability types is the following (cf. ﬁgure 8):
(tL)
PAY G < (tL)
F < ¯ t
(tH)
PAY G < ¯ t < (tH)
F
In this case, the termination of production (tH)
∗ for the high-ability worker is deﬁned by the minimum
retirement age:
(tH)
∗ = ¯ t (78)
For the low-ability worker, the separation date (tL)
∗ is determined by substituting the optimality
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Figure 8: The Eﬀects of Increasing the Statutory Retirement Age
This situation with (tL)
F < ¯ t < (tH)
F is graphically illustrated in ﬁgure 8.
According to (41), the worker’s training intensity is equal to
(eH)
∗ = ¯ eH (80)
(eL)
∗ = δ(1 − (1 − α)τ)βθL (tL)
F (81)
6.3 Interpretation
Increasing the minimum retirement age aims at augmenting the labor force participation at the extensive









0 if ¯ t < (ti)
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1 if (ti)
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F
0 if ¯ t ≥ (ti)
F
(82)
These comparative statics show that the separation date (ti)
∗ is not aﬀected if the minimum retirement
age exceeds the optimal separation date of the ﬁrm. Hence, the eﬀects of increasing the minimum
retirement age are limited by the labor market prospects of older workers. As illustrated in ﬁgure 8, the
situation (tL)
F < ¯ t < (tH)










In this case, high-ability workers are aﬀected because they are forced to stay inside the labor market
until they have reached the minimum retirement age. This is in line with the simulation results of
Gruber and Wise (2002). By contrast, there is no impact on low-ability workers because it is the ﬁrm
that decides to separate before the minimum retirement age is achieved. As in the case of individual
retirement accounts, concentrating on the worker’s retirement and training decision in (73) and (74)
and neglecting the production side of the economy may be misleading in evaluating the welfare gains of
pension reforms.
7 Conclusion
The demographic transition in industrialized countries poses challenges to the pension system which is
essentially organized according to the PAYG principle in most countries. This paper presents a two-period
partial-equilibrium model that systematically compares the implications of diﬀerent pension reforms
for the retirement behavior at the extensive margin. Starting from the current system of traditional
PAYG, two proposals for pension reforms are analyzed which aim at compensating the adverse eﬀects of
demographic change on the relative size of the active population.
Our formal analysis is based on recent literature on old-age provision, but the model manages to
explain endogenously both the date of retirement and the formation of human capital. It is important to
incorporate the training decision into the analysis of pension reforms because extending the working life
increases the return to education and thus fosters the workers’ incentives to acquire skills. Furthermore,
the model incorporates worker heterogeneity in ability which allows to analyze the implications of the
pension system for diﬀerent groups of workers. In line with Cremer, Lozachmeur, and Pestieau (2004)
and Martín (2003), the retirement age increases with the worker’s productivity which depends on initial
ability and the level of training.
Compared to the situation with laissez-faire, the traditional PAYG pension system with an imperfect
tax-beneﬁt link creates an implicit tax on extensive labor supply of older workers near retirement and
on training at the intensive margin. The weaker the tax-beneﬁt link, the larger are the implicit tax
components of the contribution rates and the more harmful are labor market distortions. In contrast,
the capital funded system implies a zero implicit tax rate because it constitutes a perfect substitute for
private savings.
The ﬁrst reform proposal suggests to introduce individual retirement accounts in order to (partly)
move from the prevalent PAYG towards a capital funded system of old-age provision. Indeed, increasing
34the size of the capital funded pillar of the pension system reduces the implicit tax on labor supply at
the extensive margin. In line with Crémer and Pestieau (2003) and Lau and Poutvaara (2001a), this
pension reform provides incentives for older workers to postpone retirement because a capital funded
system rewards late retirement with an actuarial fair increase in subsequent pension beneﬁts. A second
beneﬁt of capital funding follows from the labor market and refers to human capital formation. In line
with Trostel (1993), the worker’s ability to exploit more fully his labor potential at the extensive margin
increases the returns to human capital investments. In particular, postponed retirement lengthens the
time period over which individuals can appropriate the returns to education. In aggregate, there is
a double beneﬁt from the introduction of individual retirement accounts: reductions in labor market
distortions at the extensive margin (retirement age) as well as increased human capital formation at the
intensive margin (training intensity).
According to empirical estimates of Hernoes, Sollie, and Strom (2000), education is an important
determinant of the retirement age. While early retirement is low among high-skilled workers, low-skilled
workers tend to leave the labor force much earlier. One explanation could be that the retirement decision
is essentially distorted for low-skilled workers (for example due to minimum pensions), which implies
that the implementation of individual retirement accounts mainly aﬀects the retirement of high-skilled
workers (Martín (2003)).
In our model, the reduced impact of individual retirement accounts on low-ability workers stems from
the ﬁrms’ employment decision at the extensive margin. It is important to include the production side
of the economy because the economic beneﬁts of pension reforms strongly depend on the employment
prospects of older workers near retirement age. In line with Lazear (1979), the ﬁrm’s separation date
increases with the worker’s educational achievement. Hence, if the capital funded pillar of the pension
system becomes strong and workers strive to signiﬁcantly postpone retirement, low-ability workers may
not attain their optimal retirement age because ﬁrms refuse to employ them any longer. Depending on
the degree of capital funding, the beneﬁts of this pension reform mainly accrue for high-ability workers
while the beneﬁts for low-ability workers are reduced once their employment prospects near retirement
age are controlled for.
The second reform proposal suggests to increase the relative size of the active population by raising
the minimum retirement age. Again, only high-ability workers may be aﬀected because they are forced
to stay inside the labor market until they have reached the minimum retirement age. In contrast, there
may be no impact on low-ability workers if their separation date is determined by the ﬁrms before the
minimum retirement age is achieved. This is in line with simulation results of Gruber and Wise (2002).
In our model, retirement and human capital formation are endogenously determined and depend on
the individual ability of workers. Nevertheless, the model has been kept simple for expositional and
calculational reasons. The theoretical results of our stylized model only allow for qualitative conclusions
concerning the evaluation of pension reforms. In order to assess the quantitative magnitude of these
eﬀects, we would have to estimate the elasticities of the workers’ retirement and training responses. How-
ever, the underlying insights into the model presented here are robust to various types of generalization.
Hence, they constitute a promising basis for policy recommendations and for future research.
35A Retirement and Training with Laissez-Faire
As shown in Section 3.2, the FOC with laissez-faire are the following:
δβ(1 + ei)θi = δγti (A1)




Solving (A2) for t and substituting the result into (A1) implies
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2 (A4)
B Comparison of the Comparative Statics with Individual Re-
tirement Accounts
For ω > ¯ ω, (tL)
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